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In the former Ottoman dominions, cataclysmic 
events followed the end of the First World War, 
particularly the collapse of the Young Turk ad-
ministration, the division of the Ottoman em-
pire in 1919 by foreign armies, the treaty of 
Sèvres, the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek 
army, the long Greek–Turkish war and the ex-
change of populations between Greece and 
Turkey ratified by the Lausanne treaty in 1923. 
The complete political and spatial reshaping of 
the region brought about by these events con-
siderably affected all major and minor popu-
lation groups living in the empire. The end of 
the war and the population exchange bore am-
bivalent meaning, as for the Turks they signi-
fied a glorious victory and the springboard of 
the new Turkish Republic towards a path for 
progress unhindered by the Ottoman past and 
irritating non-Muslims. For the Greeks, these 
events represented a Megali Katastrofi (Great 
Disaster), a major national destruction in mod-
ern Greek history, which had the side effect of 
bringing the bulk of Ottoman Greeks who sur-
vived the war within the borders of the Greek 
national state. These events were integrated 
in the Greek and Turkish national narratives 
in different and antagonistic ways, yet both 
share common rhetorical strategies: Greeks 
and Turks are understood as coherent and 
homogenous bodies pitted against each oth-
er in a life-or-death struggle. Greek historians 
underlined the barbarity of the Turks, holding 
them responsible for the massacre of hun-
dreds of thousands of Christians, while Turkish 
historians retaliated on the same ground argu-
ing that Muslims suffered even more in a war 
of crucial importance for their future. In addi-
tion, Christian minorities (both Armenian and 
Christian Orthodox) were blamed for seditious 
and treacherous activities against a benevolent 
state that was fighting for its existence. These 
old narratives remained practically unchanged 
and affected the collective historical perception 
in both countries for decades. Generations of 
Greeks and Turks were raised in an atmos-
phere of mutual distrust, if not open animosity, 
which subsequent political relations between 
Greece and Turkey did not help to calm. How-
ever, in the last ten or twenty years a grow-
ing number of scholars – Greeks, Turks and 
others – have begun to raise important issues 
about the nature of late Ottoman society. Re-
cent research has underlined the complexity of 
interreligious and ethnic relations in Ottoman 
society, particularly during the nineteenth cen-
tury when new national affiliations were mo-
bilised under the influence of nationalism and 
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the dynamics of economic and political mod-
ernisation. One issue of major concern is the 
extent of violence and the immense number of 
civilian casualties in the Ottoman lands during 
the final agonising years of the empire. Main-
stream historical wisdom in Greece and Tur-
key consistently avoids perplex issues and in-
sists on using clear-cut and coherent national 
bodies as objects of respective national(ist) 
narratives. New approaches should invest in 
more nuanced perspectives that take into ac-
count the complexity of late Ottoman society, 
the dynamics of change as well as the varie-
ty of local contexts. Of course, the relation be-
tween the local and the national or imperial 
level is intricate because not all local cases can 
be reduced to the imperial level nor can this 
level be seen as the sum of localised events. 
In any case, it is time to rethink sensitive is-
sues, particularly those related to limit events. 
I do not believe that we can reach conclusive 
answers to satisfy all sides, due to the high-
ly politicised nature of these events, but again 
uncertainty is embedded in historical knowl-
edge. The crucial thing is to extend historical 
research and rethink Ottoman society. The 
studies by Ayşe Ozil, Ryan Gingeras and Ni-
cholas Doumanis provide the niche to do this. 
Although these studies treat different issues, 
they somehow overlap, allowing the reader to 
rethink the end of the Ottoman empire and the 
rise of the nation-state in novel ways. 
Ozil’s Orthodox Christians in the late Ottoman 
Empire provides an interesting perspective re-
garding communal life of Christian Orthodox 
or Greek communities in the Ottoman empire, 
using the communities of the South Marmara 
coast as a case in point.1 Against a Greek his-
toriographical background which posits these 
communities as coherent and separate from 
other religious communities, Ozil provides a 
much more complicated picture which ques-
tions well-defined boundaries. Local adminis-
tration, finance and taxation, law and the legal 
corporate status of communal institutions, as 
well as issues of nationality, are discussed in 
detail, with the use of both Greek and Ottoman 
primary sources. According to Ozil, the emer-
gence of a distinct Christian Orthodox institu-
tional network (churches, schools, philanthrop-
ic institutions) and administrative communal 
bodies (koinotites) responsible for managing 
these institutions, did not result in a clear-cut 
milli homogenous space in which all Christian 
Orthodox were integrated. Despite the exist-
ence of this institutional sphere, local Chris-
tians reacted in a variety of ways, with some 
of them directly opposing the Ottoman Chris-
tian authorities and community structures. Ozil 
refers to numerous cases of Christian Ortho-
dox individuals who challenged the Ottoman 
Christian authorities in matters relating to tax-
ation, legal authority or even nationality. In fact, 
as the author claims, Christian Orthodox indi-
viduals were not necessarily part of Christian 
Orthodox communes, which were exclusive 
bodies with membership being conditional on 
specific requirements, including the payment 
of property tax and the holding of Ottoman na-
tionality. Although Christian Orthodox institu-
tions were open to Ottoman Christians, there 
were many cases where Ottoman Christian in-
dividuals used parallel structures, such as Ot-
toman courts, Ottoman or missionary schools, 
or simply failed to see any benefit in using Ot-
toman Christian structures, with the refusal of 
many peasants to send their children to school 
being a case in point. Existing choices involved 
tension and practical difficulties and local Chris-
tians did not necessarily take predictable steps. 
For example, although Hellenic nationality was 
available to Ottoman Christians, those opting 
for it found themselves in tension with Chris-
tians holding Ottoman nationality. In the case 
of communal administration, this was more 
or less evident, but this tension struck a pre-
carious balance when more dramatic events 








took place as, for example, the anti-Hellenic 
boycott following the declaration of Cretan in-
dependence in 1912. Then Christian Ottoman 
and Hellenic nationals found themselves fre-
quently at odds. Finally, Ozil highlights the ten-
sions regarding the legal corporate status of 
Christian Orthodox structures as far as Otto-
man law and administration are concerned. 
This was a complex legal and political issue. 
Due to the fact that the Ottoman legal system 
did not recognise corporate identity and the Ot-
toman state extended institutional authority to 
particular individuals, such as ecclesiastical or 
lay leaders, these communal structures func-
tioned in a legal lacuna. Even when the Otto-
man state introduced new legislation on cor-
porate bodies in 1913 that acknowledged the 
right to own and transfer revenue-generating 
property in towns and villages, the move was 
incomplete. Non-Muslim institutions, although 
not explicitly named, were granted owner-
ship rights but the conditions of ownership re-
mained insecure as they were subject to vari-
ous administrative restrictions. Furthermore, 
not all communal property was included. In 
addition, the state did not share its control of 
many legal matters, such as criminal cases, 
with the Christian authorities and did not grant 
much authority to the Christian notables who 
participated in Ottoman provincial administra-
tions, where decision making rested with Mus-
lim officials. Overall, the study provides a fresh 
perspective by advancing one step further re-
cent approaches that have questioned the co-
herence and homogeneity of Ottoman Christian 
“communities”, underlined existing cultural and 
social differences and stressed the policies of 
Hellenisation in producing a solid national body. 
Despite their critical thrust, these approaches 
somehow seem to accept that these policies 
were effective and that the making of “nation-
al” [milli] structures eventually produced the 
Christian Orthodox-cum-Greek national com-
munity because the Ottoman framework was 
actually conducive to this. Ozil does not sug-
gest that the process of nationalising Ottoman 
Christians was absent or unsuccessful but that 
this framework ran against the consolidation 
of communal institutions at a local level. The 
South Marmara case provides a different and 
useful perspective to rethink the limits of com-
munity building within the parameters of the 
Ottoman legal and political landscape. Whether 
one should jump to generalisations is a differ-
ent matter, though, because this is not the first 
time that we have been warned of the com-
plexities of late Ottoman history. 
If community structures failed to produce sol-
id boundaries between the Christian Ortho-
dox and their Muslim and other non-Muslim 
neighbours, the question arises about the kind 
of relations that took shape on a local level 
between different religious groups in times 
of nationalist agitation. Did forms of coexist-
ence survive in the face of nationalist agita-
tion and is there a point in time where these 
forms proved unable to sustain some kind of 
solidarity and mutual help when open armed 
conflict reached almost every part of the Otto-
man dominion between 1912 and 1922? I be-
lieve these are the sort of questions one has to 
bear in mind when reading Nicholas Douma-
nis’ book Before the Nation. The study is based 
on extensive research in the oral tradition ar-
chive of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 
which hosts an impressive and unique collec-
tion of testimonies of first- and second-gener-
ation Christian refugees from Anatolia. Dou-
manis used this material to reconstruct Asia 
Minor histories through the recollections of in-
dividual refugees, suggesting that these mem-
ories should not be neglected particularly be-
cause they contain expressions of sympathy 
and affection for neighbouring Turks, which 
runs against the official Greek narrative em-
phasising Turkish barbarity. This call for the 
rehabilitation of popular memory is interest-
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ing but it also raises crucial epistemological 
issues regarding the limits of representation 
and the complex and nonlinear relation of his-
tory and memory. Refugee memories strike 
a coherent narrative: beginning in the times 
of Abdul Hamid, “the Ottoman belle époque”, 
where coexistence between Christians and 
Muslims was an everyday reality, this is fol-
lowed by escalating tensions and ends with the 
Great Disaster and the final removal of Chris-
tians from their ancestral homes. In the years 
before 1912, Ottoman Christians benefited 
from a tolerant sultanic regime which allowed 
them to prosper whereas Christians and Mus-
lims shared mutual respect and some com-
mon practices which sustained the social or-
der at local level. The Young Turkish regime 
brought major changes which increased state 
interference and politicised society, thus un-
dermining existing intercommunal relations. 
The outbreak of the Balkan wars seriously 
affected intercommunal relations in Anatolia 
as Muslim refugees, particularly Muslim Cre-
tans, played a major role in the radicalisation of 
Muslim reactions and the animosity between 
Anatolian Christians and Muslims. Experienc-
es of deportation, forced marches and depriva-
tion during the First World War further shaped 
the reactions of many Greek refugees towards 
the Ottoman state, according to testimonies. 
The reciprocity of violence during a decade 
of warfare involving both Christian and Mus-
lims made reconciliation impossible. Christian 
Muslim coexistence, which proved functional 
in Anatolia but not necessarily so elsewhere 
in the empire, collapsed within years under 
the weight of extended warfare. Bad times re-
placed good times and existing forms of co-
existence dissipated amid extensive violence. 
However, many refugees kept the memory of 
the good relations with their Muslim neigh-
bours intact and attributed the loss of their 
homelands and the loss of life of many of their 
coreligionists to political conjunctures, high 
politics, imperial designs and outsiders, peo-
ple foreign to their towns and villages and not 
to the actions of their “own Turks”. 
Refugee memories exonerating “our Turks” 
and putting the blame on outsiders is prob-
ably a way of negotiating with the traumatic 
past. Refugee memory, selective as memo-
ry always is, rescued the “good Turk” as part 
of the familiar but now lost homeland. On the 
other hand, these memories seem to repress 
or simply ignore other facets of the past, in-
cluding social conflict and social hierarchies or 
even the enlistment of Ottoman Christians in 
the Greek army or paramilitary bands. Even if 
the questionnaire addressed to them by the in-
terviewers of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies 
ignored such issues, respondents could bring 
them out themselves. I do not suggest that ref-
erence to “good Turks” were completely im-
aginary; far from it. There were many cases 
where Turks helped Greeks or tried to save 
them. I simply refer to the fact that refugee 
memories seem to have followed a narrative 
pattern which is important in its own right and 
not because they corresponded to actual facts. 
If these memories are of value, as I believe they 
are, it is because they allow us to consider how 
refugees restructured their emotional disposi-
tion in relation to their contemporary position 
and life in a new country. For that purpose, the 
negotiation of the past symbolised a space of 
stability and was vital for many Ottoman Greek 
refugees who aspired or hoped to reach some 
kind of stability and normality with their life in 
Greece. One should always remember that for 
many refugee families it took decades before 
they left the crowded temporary settlements 
in which the Greek government placed them 
after their arrival in Greece in 1922. In addition, 
refugees were directly involved in Greek poli-
tics and many of them were implicated with 
the Greek left, suffering immensely during and 
after the Greek Civil War, as all people on the 








left did. In other words, this reviewer opines 
that the memories of the refugees proba-
bly reveal more about social life in post-1922 
Greece than the actual Ottoman past. Cast in 
the metaphoric language of nostalgia, refugee 
memory tended to idealise the past as a com-
ment to what was usually an unenviable life 
in the squalor of the urban settlements where 
most refugee families lived. 
Intercommunal relations and long coexistence 
did not stop the destruction of the “multieth-
nic” Ottoman society. Even if ethnic difference 
alone is not the cause of violence, as Douma-
nis does not cease to repeat, Ottoman Anato-
lia was the arena of serious fighting, not only 
between official armies but also between par-
amilitary bands, though many times the line 
between the two were blurred. Ryan Gingeras’ 
Sorrowful Shores shows how complicated this 
fighting actually was because it did not sim-
ply involve “Greeks and Turks”, or “Muslims 
and Christians”, but it also divided to some 
considerable extent the Muslim population of 
Western Asia Minor. The book focuses on the 
South Marmara area and the villayet of Hüdav-
endigar and, from this aspect, it refers to the 
same space as Ozil’s study. Gingeras brings to 
the fore the networks of Muslim immigrants 
from the Caucasus (Circassians, Dagestanis) 
and the Balkan provinces that settled in South 
Marmara, where they engaged in banditry and, 
during the long wars of 1912–1922, in para-
military activity. The allegiance of these armed 
bands oscillated according to immediate ma-
terial and political concerns. Many were used 
to protect the rich Muslim landlords of the re-
gion while others practiced banditry for sub-
sistence. During the war many were involved 
in the paramilitary organisations set up by the 
Young Turks, even in the infamous Teşkilat-i 
Mahsusa (Special Organisation), and partici-
pated in the campaigns against Christian Or-
thodox and Armenian civilians. The collapse 
of the Ottoman empire was a watershed. For-
eign invasions, particularly the Greek occupa-
tion of Smyrna, the emergence of the Kemal-
ist movement, the huge civilian casualties due 
to Christian massacres, and deportation and 
deprivation, reshaped local allegiances and in-
creased Muslim anxieties about the future of 
the area. This conjuncture, however, involved 
more than one choice. Local Muslim groups 
constantly negotiated their political affiliation 
not only with the Kemalist nationalist move-
ment but also with Islamic and loyalist forc-
es. In this context, as Gingeras clearly shows, 
conflict between nationalist forces and Muslim 
militias subscribing to different political agen-
das was not uncommon. The study discusses 
in some depth the conflict between Circassian 
paramilitary bands and Turkish national-
ist forces in Hüdavendigar after the treaty of 
Sèvres as well as the different political agen-
das with which different groups of Circassians 
associated themselves with: loyalist and Is-
lamic affiliations, cooperation with the Greek 
army, plans for regional autonomy as well di-
rect association with Turkish nationalists. 
Sorrowful Shores allows the reader to under-
stand the complicate situation on a local scale, 
where conflicts and shifting allegiances played 
a vital role in the radicalisation of the war that 
involved paramilitary groups affiliated to the 
various ethnoreligious groups. At this point, 
some crucial questions arise. Given the ex-
tent of the war and the immense loss of life, 
one wonders whether the emphasis on par-
amilitary activity exonerates official Ottoman 
state policies of ethnic cleansing, particularly 
the actions against the Armenians during the 
First World War. It is not the opinion of this re-
viewer that Gingeras follows this line of argu-
mentation closely, though there are moments 
where one gets the impression that he accom-
modates the official Turkish thesis according 
to which Ottoman Christians, both Orthodox 
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and Armenians, posed a threat to the integrity 
of the empire, which was actually the official 
excuse for mass deportations. Although there 
were many cases where Ottoman Christians 
supported the enemies of the empire – for ex-
ample, Armenian volunteers joined the Rus-
sian army and Ottoman Greeks enlisted in the 
Greek army of occupation – the bulk of Chris-
tians stood aloof from politics. Yet, in the exi-
gency of war, the Young Turk leadership did 
not hesitate to accuse Christians of treason 
and acted accordingly, ordering mass forced 
expulsions which ended in the death of hun-
dreds of thousands, particularly Armenians. 
Hundreds of thousands of civilians suffered 
because this leadership applied the unjustifi-
able principle of collective responsibility which, 
according to many historians, was simply part 
of a major effort to control “unruly” minorities. 
Thus, generalising statements about the con-
duct of Christians or Muslims during the war is 
certainly counterproductive, as the case of the 
Muslims of the South Marmara area, which 
Gingeras discuss in detail, clearly shows. 
Leaving this issue aside for a moment, one 
wonders about the effects of this prolonged 
war on a local level. Was it possible that this 
bitter war unleashed local conflicts associ-
ated with local interests and vendettas that 
were conducted by paramilitary if not criminal 
bands? Does the local scale put in sharp relief 
the nature of existing antagonisms and con-
flict as being devoid of formal ideological con-
tent? If this is the case, how is this scale ar-
ticulated with the national or imperial scale in 
which political and ideological agendas are far 
more emphasised as the basis for mass mo-
bilisation? What was the role of these agendas 
in the outbreak of conflicts in the South Mar-
mara region? Although Gingeras focuses on 
the social networks of Circassians and other 
Muslim groups, he does not neglect to discuss 
ideological and political issues, albeit not ex-
tensively. 
The studies by Ozil, Gingeras and Douma-
nis are food for thought. Although they focus 
on different issues and treat slightly different 
though overlapping periods, they somehow 
bring to the fore some of the major issues 
of the late Ottoman era: imperial reorganisa-
tion, nationalist building, ethnic and religious 
boundaries, and warfare and violence against 
civilians. Reading these books, one could not 
stop wondering about the excessively violent 
nature of the long war of 1912–1922. The is-
sues here are far from clear. Ozil suggests that 
Ottoman Christians did not necessarily identify 
with Orthodox structures and that a homoge-
nous Christian Orthodox–Greek space did not 
emerge; Doumanis underlines the feelings of 
affection which Ottoman Christians harboured 
for their Turkish neighbours as well as the 
sense that these feelings were reciprocated. 
How then can one understand the excessive 
violence which engulfed Ottoman territories 
during the decade of war from 1912–1922? 
Should one be led to believe that if nationalist 
agendas were more effective, they would have 
caused more violence even if the big wars did 
not happen? Was this kind of violence specif-
ic to the internal dynamics of Ottoman socie-
ty? Any answer to these questions must take 
into account that nationalist agendas were 
not necessarily secessionist but also integra-
tive, as the project of Greek–Ottoman cooper-
ation [ελληνο–οθωμανισμός] suggests. As for 
violence itself, one should also remember that 
it was already evident in parts of the Ottoman 
dominion long before the outbreak of the Bal-
kan wars, though not in Asia Minor, which is 
the subject of the three studies under consid-
eration. Ottoman Macedonia, for example, had 
seen its fair share of violence since the 1870s, 
though this conflict pitted Greek against Bul-
garian bands which shared the Orthodox re-
ligion but subscribed to different nationalist 
agendas. What made the situation more com-
plicated is the way external and internal fac-








tors responsible for the outbreak of violence 
overlapped. Ottoman imperial decline, na-
tionalist agitation and European imperialist 
designs were part of the same political and 
power texture which interacted with local con-
ditions and affected local allegiances through-
out the last half-century of the empire. In this 
context there were different patterns of local 
reactions to broader dynamics, as Gingeras 
shows. To put it schematically, one may as-
sume that these dynamics were responsible 
for the radicalisation of ethnic and national an-
tagonisms that took place in the final years of 
the empire. The exigencies of war and the de-
struction of existing patterns of trust and coex-
istence were the effect of the gradual radicali-
sation of the war, which remained inconclusive 
long enough to test political affiliations and 
practices and reshape identities. The destruc-
tion of Armenians, the persecutions and ex-
pulsion of Ottoman Greeks and the exodus of 
Muslims from Macedonia and Thrace were the 
bitter outcome of a long war which engulfed all 
the major “ethnoreligious” groups of the em-
pire. It was the war itself, the unpredictability of 
chaos, which created the conditions of exces-
sive brutality and reshaped ethnic identities. 
On the other hand, a broader perspective of 
the big picture does not necessarily suffice to 
explain the dynamics of local societies where 
factors that cannot be easily reduced to the big 
picture played a significant part in the shap-
ing of local events. In other words, one must 
be prepared to face the possibility that the ef-
fects of the war on a local level developed the 
kind of dynamic that cannot be reduced to a 
major primary cause – interstate warfare. In 
this respect the local and the “imperial” level 
were interwoven, but not in a commensurate 
fashion. “Outsiders” like the Muslim Cretans or 
the Circassians, who were forced to move out 
of their homelands in Crete and the northern 
Caucasus, reshaped their identities and affect-
ed the social order in western Asia Minor as a 
response to local circumstances. Bitter experi-
ences before their arrival in Asia Minor cannot 
explain the political choices of these groups in 
Asia Minor unless one takes into considera-
tion how they fitted or did not fit into the social 
and cultural fabric of this new environment. 
In this light, the local scale can better inform 
the dynamics of violence without reducing the 
phenomenon to the state of general radicalisa-
tion of practices and consciousness which the 
“long war” of 1912–1922 brought about. 
However helpful the above hypothesis might 
be, it needs qualification to prevent it ending up 
as a kind of generalisation that explains less 
than it reveals. What pitfalls are involved here? 
I want to address this by discussing violence 
against civilians in the late Ottoman period, 
an issue which I believe historians of the peri-
od should take into consideration. One should 
never forget the high number of civilian casual-
ties, mostly Christians but also Muslims, who 
were victims of massacres, forced migration, 
hunger and disease during the course of this 
long war. One should also not forget that these 
deaths were not accidental but were, to one de-
gree or another, the outcome of specific mili-
tary and political decisions. How can historians 
deal with what in the modern official idiom of 
warfare is called “collateral damage”, especial-
ly on this immense scale? Counting bodies or 
minimising the significance of these decisions 
is morally unacceptable. Taking sides is a 
clear-cut choice but insufficient. In the context 
of the long war of 1912–1922, all sides were 
implicated to one degree or another in atroc-
ities and brutal practices in defence of what 
they believed were their “natural rights”, which 
in the context of the period under consideration 
seemed reasonable to those supporting them. 
Of course, this does not mean we equate vic-
tims and perpetrators, as, for example, mem-
bers of the Teskilat-i Mahsusa with Ottoman 
Armenian civilians. However, in this chang-
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ing war scene, the lines between victims and 
perpetrators were sometimes blurred as the 
victim became the perpetrator and vice versa, 
as happened during the Greek–Turkish war. 
Is it possible to construe a coherent narrative 
which does justice to all sides and, particularly, 
to all victims of the war? Most probably this is 
impossible considering the political nature of 
history writing. Yet even if we were to reach 
a point where a number of solid studies are 
available – and the studies under review cer-
tainly merit this distinction – can we be certain 
that all historiographical and moral issues in-
volved in the study of this particular past would 
be resolved? This rhetorical question simply 
underlines the fact that historical interpreta-
tions, which actually purport to tame the chaos 
of the past, cannot satisfactorily address mor-
al and even historiographical issues, particu-
larly when historical events of this magnitude 
are considered, on the basis of the historical 
record alone. Do interpretations that take into 
account forms of coexistence, the complexities 
of local contexts, or retrospective negotiations 
of the past actually construe a kind of normal-
ising discourse which seeks to understand and 
therefore to forgive or condone? Does under-
standing equal forgiveness? Does normalisa-
tion of the past equal mourning? Or should one 
always reject reconciliation and exclude nor-
malising interpretations, insisting instead on 
the kind of theodicy which informed nation-
alist narratives? Issues such as these always 
imply a level of philosophical and political re-
flection beyond the historical record itself and 
are therefore beyond proof, strictly speaking. 
This is the unstable ground that most histo-
rians fear to tread or simply avoid; yet it is full 
of potential. 
I want to take this argument one step further 
by addressing two related issues. Historians of 
the late Ottoman period usually repress phil-
osophical and epistemological issues in their 
work, follow the record and try to set the sto-
ry straight. Despite tons of new evidence, con-
sensus on these issues is still far away and 
probably it will never occur. Of course, one 
could counter this by pointing to the kind of 
rational explanation which, based on histori-
cal facts, could provide satisfactory interpreta-
tions. This sounds right and most of the time 
this seems to be acceptable for historians. Yet, 
the question remains whether rational ex-
planations are really sufficient to understand 
tragic events such as those under considera-
tion, based on historical facts alone. Can we 
expect to find rational explanations about the 
motives and interests behind acts of excessive 
violence? Rather, what seems to be at stake 
are the limits of rationality, particularly this 
kind of rationality that pits reason and emo-
tion as exact opposites and is totally unrecep-
tive to any consideration regarding the compli-
cated and interactive relation between the two. 
Thus even if all rational factors (motives, inter-
ests, social dynamics, etc.) are added up, there 
remains a residue which cannot be explained 
rationally. As with many other limit events, the 
search for motives and interests provides only 
half answers. What historians actually see is 
the effect of human actions and not the kind of 
psychocultural workings behind these actions, 
which usually remain unrecorded. People act 
and react in ways that challenge the concept of 
transparent, rational motivation, which predi-
cated certain acts and not others. Even if we 
broaden the scope of motivation and acknowl-
edge that there were motivations of a differ-
ent nature at work simultaneously (local pow-
er games, restructured identities, crisis of 
personality, strategies of subsistence), none-
theless it is difficult to explain adequately the 
extent of violence against civilians that took 
place in the long war of 1912–1922. Motive as 
a mode of causality simply fails to explain eve-
rything at this level. On the other hand, an em-
phasis on motivation and rationality does not 








adequately address individual suffering and 
loss because attention is directed to all sorts 
of political or military decisions which actually 
shaped the course of “big” events. In this con-
text, individual states of emotion usually are 
of no interest to historians unless they can be 
considered as expressions of a broader phe-
nomenon. There are epistemological conse-
quences in this choice regarding disciplinary 
boundaries that must be put into sharp re-
lief. It is well known that testimonies change 
with the passing of time, that they tend to be 
inaccurate in some important or less impor-
tant details, that they integrate facts and other 
memories which were not available when the 
events to which testimonies refer occurred. 
For these reasons, historians tend to trivialise 
the value of testimonies as a reliable source 
of historical knowledge and, more generally, 
tend to overemphasise the distinction of mem-
ory and (true) history. In this manner, histori-
ans also make concrete judgments about the 
boundaries of history as a discipline that deals 
with the past in specific ways and uses spe-
cific material for the historiographical opera-
tion. Here the kind of material which historians 
seem to value most, at least theoretically, is 
“nonintentional” evidence which was not made 
with an eye to the future. In contrast, individ-
ual testimonies are often held suspect as a 
means of justification of the acts and intentions 
of particular individuals. Of course, the distinc-
tion between “intentional” and “nonintentional” 
evidence is fragile to say the least. Historians 
use various kinds of material without being, 
most of the time, in a position to distinguish 
between these two categories, or even think 
they are worth distinguishing. Although there 
is evidence which might be deemed imperson-
al and part of everyday stuff, like food prices, 
birth rates, exchange rates or train schedules, 
their value is only relative to the major issues 
which historians seek to address. In the face 
of limit events in particular, this kind of evi-
dence is only partially helpful. Train schedules 
to Auschwitz, for example, were indicative of 
the mass transportations of Jews there, but 
in itself this evidence falls short of explaining 
the Holocaust. We knew about the Nazi geno-
cide long before we had knowledge of the train 
schedules to Auschwitz. Part of our knowl-
edge of the Holocaust or of other extreme 
events comes from individual victim testimo-
nies which, subjective and emotional as they 
are, cannot be squeezed into broader catego-
ries of meaning. What will be done with these 
testimonies? What’s more, what can be done 
with the voices that have left no trace in the 
historical record? Should individual testimo-
ny be taken at face value, as a monument to 
the suffering self, or will it be relevant to his-
tory only in its most superficial and impres-
sionistic level? Should we guard disciplinary 
boundaries which today appear obsolete and 
restrict ourselves from exploring new possi-
bilities and alternatives of historical thinking? If 
historians are not content with this situation, if 
they somehow wish to address issues related 
to individual testimonies of victims of extreme 
events, then they need to embark on the kind 
of philosophical and aesthetic reflection which, 
though remote from the well-trodden fields of 
historical empirical work, is perhaps capable 
of making the understanding of violence, suf-
fering and death more possible. 
NOTE
1   I am aware of the intricacies implicated in 
these terms, but for the purposes of this re-
view I will use them interchangeably.
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